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3For the past 15 years, mentoring has been 
America’s single most publicly talked about, 
written about and broadly popular social 
intervention to improve the lives of disadvan-
taged youth. It now appears as an approved 
activity in many pieces of legislation, from 
the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 to the 
Juvenile Delinquency Prevention Block Grant 
of 2005-2006. Foundation officials say that 
mentoring is featured in almost all human service 
funding proposals, whether requested or not.
Our highest elected officials love it. In 1997, 
then President Clinton, former Presidents Bush 
and Ford, and former First Lady Nancy Reagan 
joined General Colin Powell in Philadelphia, 
along with thousands of citizens representing 
communities across America, to celebrate vol-
unteerism and to propose five essential “nutri-
ents” key to disadvantaged youth. Mentoring 
was first on the list. And in his 2003 State of 
the Union address, President Bush proposed 
nearly half a billion dollars for two new men-
toring initiatives. Sitting in the seat next to 
the First Lady was Philadelphia’s Democratic 
Mayor John Street, whose city the president 
had recently visited twice—specifically to spend 
time at Philadelphia’s innovative mentoring 
program for children of prisoners. The list 
could go on and might include the placement 
of mentoring messages in many TV shows—a 
purposeful inclusion inspired by one wealthy 
philanthropist’s belief in the power of the mass 
media to affect volunteering.
All this during an era when skepticism about 
the effectiveness and utility of social pro-
grams was increasing, and included many 
Democrats; when long-standing social pro-
grams that seemed like permanent fixtures, 
such as Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) and Head Start, were ended 
or challenged; and when the language of 
social welfare was being replaced by that of 
personal responsibility.
How did mentoring fare so well in these 
times? Is mentoring now a durable part of 
American social policy? If so—is this unal-
loyed good news?
Introduction
* This brief is adapted from an article that first appeared in DuBois and Karcher, ed., The Handbook of 
Youth Mentoring. Sage Publications, Inc. 2005.
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of life, are not totally explainable by rational 
analysis and orderly chains of logic. But it is 
also not entirely mysterious why mentoring 
should have such sustained popularity.
First, mentoring makes sense to most people, regard-
less of their politics. Young beings need sup-
port and guidance from older beings—we all 
know that instinctively. Watch a few nature 
shows on the Discovery Channel and you see 
how universal the need is; it applies to bears, 
foxes, birds and whales as well as humans. 
Read a little science on mammalian develop-
ment and you find that the more complex a 
young being’s brain, the more adult support 
and guidance needed; ergo, little humans need 
a lot of help from bigger humans. Common 
sense and science wholeheartedly agree.
And many people—again, regardless of their 
politics—can remember the importance to 
them of a nonfamily adult in their lives, how 
that person helped them think clearly about a 
hard issue or set them on a learning or work 
path that has made a great positive difference 
in their lives. So besides the backing of com-
mon sense and science, mentoring stirs up in 
many adults very personal, meaningful and 
positive memories.
Mentoring also offers to some people a com-
fort from the fear of ungoverned little humans 
growing up into unruly adults, wreaking havoc 
on everything around them. Though I have 
not taken a scientific survey, my experience is 
that except for a few ideologues, most adults, 
perhaps especially those with children, would 
take a view of raw human nature that has at 
least as much of Hobbes as of Rousseau. I once 
heard a report on National Public Radio about 
225 Chihuahuas in California that had been 
set free as pups, turned feral and were roam-
ing in bands, frightening hikers. If unparented 
Chihuahuas can group together and inspire 
fear in adult humans….
Second, mentoring fits neatly with dominant 
American cultural values. That mentoring 
makes sense—intuitively, experientially and 
scientifically—may not seem so distinctive 
to some:
After all, doesn’t meeting any number of 
youthful needs (e.g., housing, health, educa-
tion) make sense?
But mentoring’s strength is not only that the 
need it represents—adult support and guid-
ance—seems somehow more basic than other 
needs but also that it can be met in ways that 
do not grate against dominant cultural values. 
Most Americans are not for “big government”; 
they are for volunteerism and the “personal 
touch” versus the paid professional as a means 
to help people; and they prefer to think most 
individual issues can be resolved by willpower 
and determination, with a minimum of out-
side help, rather than by the provision of 
comprehensive services. Agree or not, right 
or wrong, these are rock-solid elements of the 
American value system.
Most social programs scrape like fingernails 
on a blackboard against one or more of these 
values. Talk of the need for “comprehensive” 
or “long-term” services not only runs counter 
to these values—to many, it seems to undercut 
their development! Mentoring does no such 
grating against these basic values. It seems in 
fact to affirm them: some help from a kindly 
adult, a volunteer at that, no government 
bureaucracy needed; and the result is that 
the youth marches into his or her future on 
a mainstream path, transformed. The specter 
of dependency is not present. Thus, mentor-
ing has never had the uphill struggle that 
most social programs face in gaining sup-
port; rather, it has only picked up speed and 
momentum, like a downhill racer.
Third, mentoring has results. In an era in which 
social programs are increasingly called on to 
prove their worth with hard numbers, mentor-
ing seems golden. P/PV’s 1995 impact study of 
the Big Brothers Big Sisters program, using a 
How It Happened
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evidence that mentoring had positive impacts 
on a range of important elements in a youth’s 
life, from curtailing drug use to improving 
school attendance to reducing fighting in the 
schoolyard (Tierney, Grossman, Resch 1995). 
BBBSA has used the impact study and its find-
ings very effectively in its marketing, helping 
the organization almost triple in size during 
the first nine years after the results came out. 
In a political atmosphere where the prevail-
ing sentiment is that most social programs are 
either ineffective or, if effective, not impres-
sively so, mentoring stands out.
Much as mentoring’s commonsense appeal 
benefits from its consistency with American 
cultural values, so does the perception of 
its evaluation findings. Though the impact 
findings are real and impressive, in fact they 
apply only to the 18 months after mentoring 
began—that was as long as comparative  
follow-up work could extend, as no one 
wanted to deny the control group the pos-
sibility of a mentor longer than that. Thus, 
we have no scientific evidence that mentoring 
“turns lives around”; its long-term transforma-
tional impact is, scientifically speaking, not 
known. The truth is that a number of social 
programs that have been rigorously evaluated 
also produce positive impacts for a modest 
time period. But none affirm common sense 
and basic American values as much as mentor-
ing, and thus mentoring’s documented good 
results, albeit more short term than trans-
formational, are widely accepted as ultimate 
proof of its value.
Fourth, mentoring has BBBSA as its exemplar. 
Ideas abound for helping young people. Many 
get tried; some have their brief moment in the 
sun; most come and go in fairly short cycles. 
There are many reasons for this revolving-door 
nature of American social policy, and one in 
particular is very relevant to the staying power 
of mentoring: America is a land of institutions 
and brand names more than it is a land of 
ideas. Its competitive, free-market economic 
system drives this orientation and makes most 
Americans fleetingly interested in ideologies 
and ideas and enduringly interested in the 
institutions and brand names that represent 
them. Though it is easy to criticize this orienta-
tion as anti-intellectual and shallow, it is equally 
easy to spot its strength: Americans are inclined 
to pay more attention to the concrete manifes-
tations of ideas—to the accountability of ideas—
than to their mental images.
BBBSA is one of America’s most recognized, 
most respected nonprofit institutions. It was 
privately initiated, organized, governed and 
grown to a national federation; it uses volun-
teers; it only does mentoring. It fits perfectly 
with American values, and it is well known. 
Mentoring as a social program idea benefits 
enormously from the existence of BBBSA: It 
gives it not only respect and credibility but 
staying power.
Fifth, mentoring’s costs are not high. At an esti-
mated $1,000 to $1,500 per year per mentor, 
(Fountain, Arbreton 1999), mentoring’s costs 
fall in the range of most after-school and sum-
mer programming and are much less than 
intensive remedial programming and more 
comprehensive service programs. In addition, 
mentoring’s costs, which mainly go toward 
the selection, training and ongoing sup-
port of mentors, have been supported in the 
evaluation literature as critical to the effective 
functioning of volunteer mentors (DuBois, 
Holloway, Valentine, Cooper 2002).
In short, mentoring has a significant number 
of important assets that help explain why it 
has become such a popular social interven-
tion—and why its popularity has endured. But 
why now? Mentoring and BBBSA have been 
around for a long time—as a formal program, 
for almost a century (see Baker and Maguire, 
in DuBois, Karcher 2005). Why the surge in 
growth and popularity in the last decade of the 
20th century and the early years of this one?
It’s difficult to address issues of “historical 
period” confidently when the one you’re living 
in is part of the issue. But there are several  
factors that no doubt play important roles. One 
is simply a sense of discouragement that many 
feel—Republicans and Democrats, conserva-
tives and liberals—that so few social programs 
generate substantial and positive results. That 
discouragement has prompted a lot of search-
ing for new ideas, or for ideas to revitalize. The 
notion of a more straightforward and human-
ized social intervention, after several decades 
of interventions focused on “services,” was, in 
retrospect, simply waiting to happen.
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idea. The Commonwealth Foundation was 
aggressively spreading the word of mentor-
ing’s virtues and effects by the late 1980s. 
Early in the 1990s, several individual philan-
thropists, most notably Ray Chambers and 
Geoff Boisi, began to promote mentoring in 
high-profile ways that the social policy sector 
rarely attempts or is comfortable with. The 
1997 Presidents’ Summit was one result; the 
formation of a national mentoring advocacy 
organization, The One to One Partnership, 
Inc. (now referred to as MENTOR/National 
Mentoring Partnership) was another; use of 
the popular media was another.
The 1997 Presidents’ Summit was formed to 
build on the work of organizations such as 
the Points of Light Foundation, United Way 
of America, Communities in Schools and 
MENTOR. In fact, mentoring (caring adults 
in the lives of young people) was consid-
ered the cornerstone of America’s Promise, 
the organization that emerged out of the 
Presidents’ Summit. So, in short, mentoring 
had champions, who bred other champions, 
across all sectors.
By 1995, the evidence of mentoring’s effective-
ness was out—and was picked up and used by 
its already growing number of champions. As 
noted, by 2003, BBBSA was almost triple the 
size it had been less than a decade previously. 
It had been roughly the same size for the pre-
ceding two decades.
Finally, America’s politics—almost always 
conservative about social policy except for 
brief periods in the 1930s and 1960s to 
1970s—returned to conservatism in the 1980s 
and 1990s. Though the 1990s were domi-
nated by a Democratic president, a flush 
economy and a healthy federal budget, there 
were few new social policy initiatives of any 
size or significance. President Bill Clinton 
declared the end of “the era of big govern-
ment”; his Democratic secretary of labor 
(Robert Reich) did not pursue additional 
funding for youth programs because there 
was so little evidence of their effectiveness. 
An intervention based on volunteers, like 
mentoring, was appealing simply because it 
was politically feasible. Some of its support-
ers were enthusiastic; others were lukewarm, 
resigned to it because so little else was viable; 
together, they made its growth possible.
Is Mentoring Now Established  
Social Policy?
You might think, after the foregoing dis-
cussion, that the answer to the question of 
whether mentoring is now established social 
policy would be a resounding “yes.” But the 
answer is more complicated than that, despite 
mentoring’s popularity, press, results and 
growth. Part of the complication has little 
to do with mentoring and more to do with 
the complex political structure of the United 
States. If, for example, our standard of “estab-
lished social policy” is a major act of Congress, 
funded sufficiently to meet the needs of a sub-
stantial share of those who need it, mentoring 
is not established social policy.
But of course few things meet that standard. 
Social Security is (for now); Head Start almost 
is; Job Corps is not; nor is the recent No Child 
Left Behind (2001) legislation—as most social 
policy legislation is not. If we take away the 
“substantial share” requirement, we get more 
“established” social policy, but we also get more 
emptiness: Consider the legislation of several 
decades ago calling for full employment….
Mentoring has neither a major act of 
Congress nor an allocation of federal funds 
sufficient to provide mentors to more than a 
modest share of those youth who might need 
them. So it is not “established federal policy.”
On the other hand, mentoring has enjoyed 
the leadership of many in Congress, includ-
ing former Representative Tom Osborne of 
Nebraska, who, in 2002, spearheaded the 
creation and funding of a new federal grant 
program dedicated exclusively to mentoring. 
Just two years later, this program was slated 
for a major increase, along with a mentoring 
program for children of prisoners, as part of 
the Bush administration’s proposal to expand 
the reach of mentoring. Representative Chaka 
Fattah and Senators Landrieu, Clinton and 
Specter, among others, have also promoted 
mentoring initiatives. Mentoring is now pro-
moted or permitted in a wide range of fed-
eral legislation, over a wide range of federal 
departments. There are special mentoring 
initiatives located in the Justice, Education, 
and Health and Human Services departments; 
the Workforce Investment Act (1998), admin-
istered by the Labor Department, encour-
ages mentoring generally, while the Labor 
Department’s major initiative on prisoner 
reentry specifically emphasizes it.
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into federal policy in every federal depart-
ment that deals with youth. It has the support 
of all major political and business leaders—
and the public. Thus, it could be said to be 
“beginning” to be established federal social 
policy, and the extent to which those begin-
nings flourish (or wither) is, simply, unknown. 
But the foundations are strong.
So strong that even in an era of serious bud-
get deficits and competing fiscal priorities—
an era in which discretionary social programs 
are likely to be one of the first lines of attack 
for reduction—mentoring’s foothold is prob-
ably as firm as a social program could hope 
for. You can read the 2003 and 2004 State of 
the Union addresses as an indication that it 
may be one of those rare social interventions 
that are promoted and increased as others are 
criticized and cut.
In addition, assessing whether a particular 
idea is established social policy solely or 
primarily through the lens of major federal 
legislation is a narrow view in several respects. 
Certainly, federal funds are indispensable 
to any social policy if it is to achieve signifi-
cant size. But there are ways to use federal 
funds that do not involve major legislation: 
earmarks; special initiatives within federal 
departments; and an emphasis, encourage-
ment or allowance of a particular practice 
(like mentoring) within other pieces of leg-
islation. Mentoring has achieved all of these 
“other” ways of using federal monies. In total, 
their actual use amounts to probably no more 
than $250 million in federal funds, which at 
a $1,000 per mentor, per year, would fund 
250,000 mentors. But that is triple the size 
of the entire BBBSA program in America in 
1995, which provides some idea of how recent 
the growth in mentoring, and public funding 
for it, has been. Until recently, mentoring was 
supported primarily through private funds.
The size of that private funding is difficult to 
confirm with precision. Like public funding, 
it seems to have been growing, as evidenced 
by the new mentoring programs that have 
sprung up like wildflowers during the past 
decade, well before the recent increase in 
federal monies. A 1997 survey indicated that 
almost 40 percent of the mentoring programs 
surveyed were less than five years old (Sipe, 
Roder 1999). Most of those are small, and 
unlike BBBSA, it is difficult to know much 
about their size, effectiveness or funding 
source. My conservative estimate is that in 
aggregate, they equal the size of BBBSA and 
are heavily financed by private funds, usually 
individual philanthropists, small foundations 
or local United Ways. Thus, they represent 
perhaps $250 million in private funds, which, 
along with BBBSA’s private funding of $200 
million, amounts to close to $500 million in 
private funding.
No thorough survey has been done of state 
and local government funding of mentor-
ing using state and local tax revenues. We 
do know that some states—New York and 
California are major examples—have estab-
lished statewide mentoring initiatives using 
state resources. So have some localities. 
Though it is impossible at this point to make 
an accurate guess about the collective state 
and local resources being used, it does seem 
likely that when all public and private finances 
being directed to formal mentoring programs 
are added, mentoring funding is in the billion-
dollar range.
Is that large? Certainly, not by federal stan-
dards, where billion-dollar programs are 
numerous. But viewed as funds directed 
to one very particular and defined kind of 
intervention, mentoring programs join a less 
numerous class. Regarded as funds directed to 
a particular kind of intervention with robust, 
positive results—even if not quite so strong as 
some of its advocates claim—it joins an even 
more exclusive club.
But more important than the total funds is the 
depth and variety of these funding sources, 
which strengthen mentoring’s potential to 
become a vital element of America’s social pol-
icy. Ron Haskins, formerly majority staff direc-
tor of the House Ways and Means Committee 
during the first Bush administration and now a 
senior fellow at The Brookings Institution, has 
created, based on his legislative experience, an 
interesting pictorial of the various factors that 
influence the durability of legislation (Haskins, 
2003). Though he does not claim exactness 
or invariability for the share of influence he 
ascribes to each factor, two broad features 
stand out: One is the variety of influences; the 
second is the power of inertia that a “policy 
continent”—the collection of institutions and 
influential individuals that have a stake in a 
8particular policy—can exert. Change is not easy 
in our form of government. Once something 
is in, with many people and institutions behind 
it, it’s hard to get out. Being so consistent 
with dominant values and having some hard 
evidence of impact, as mentoring is and does, 
must add something to that staying power.
Haskins is talking about federal legislation 
only, but it does not seem much of a leap 
to see his first broad feature—variety of 
influences—as a critical feature for the sus-
tainability of any particular social policy at all 
levels of government. In a representative form 
of government with a complex, competing set 
of institutions, sectors and individuals that can 
have influence, the broader the support for 
a particular intervention as policy, the better 
its chances to become policy, stay policy and 
grow. Thus, mentoring, though relatively new 
to the public social policy agenda and neither 
established nor large on that agenda, would 
appear to have a strong foothold. The very 
fact that it came to public policy with such 
strong and varied support from private institu-
tions and individuals makes it likely that its 
presence on that agenda will not be fleeting.
Is Mentoring as Social Policy a  
Good Thing?
It is not hard to make the argument that men-
toring’s emergence into the world of public 
social policy and funding is an unalloyed 
good. The substantive bottom line is clearly 
positive, for even if mentoring is not quite as 
effective and transformational as its advocates 
claim, there certainly is hard evidence that it 
does in fact improve the lives, behavior and 
performance of many youth—and 30 years of 
social experimentation have not produced a 
wide range of options to choose from that can 
make that claim. Who can be against some-
thing that has evidence of effectiveness?
It also would appear to have a broader social 
value. The decline in confidence in the capac-
ity of social programs to make a real differ-
ence in the lives of youth has steadily grown 
over the past 30 years. The erosion has been 
particularly deep concerning policies for ado-
lescents and has even made many who gener-
ally favor strong public social policy turn their 
support and efforts almost exclusively to 
young children—leaving little political capi-
tal for social initiatives to help youth in the 
8-to-17-year-old age range. Some speak openly, 
some whisper, but agreement has grown: This 
age range may be too late.
There are several solid grounds on which to 
decry this “go younger” trend, but it is foolish 
to dismiss it as totally irresponsible or to claim 
it is entirely political. Certainly, it is consis-
tent with the conservative trend in American 
politics, but the skepticism about the effective-
ness of social policies for youth also embraces 
much of the center of American politics and 
some of the left of center. That leaves very 
little. Skepticism has spread this far in good 
part because there is substantial evidence to 
support it—and much less evidence to coun-
ter it. Dissappointing results from some stud-
ies of after-school programming have added 
yet another arrow to the quiver of skepticism 
(Dynarski et al. 2003).
Surely, having a concrete policy initiative like 
mentoring, which works for adolescents, is an 
essential step in rebuilding confidence in pub-
lic social policy. For how can moral advocacy 
secure anything beyond rhetorical agreement, 
heartfelt sympathy and window dressing fund-
ing if there is no confidence that much of any-
thing can in fact be accomplished?
Mentoring would also appear to be a direct (if 
insufficient) response to another broad trend 
in American life: the reduction of adults in the 
lives of youth. Both parents working, the preva-
lence of one-parent families, the growth of a 
distinct youth culture, the reduction of local 
funding for recreational programs, legal and 
practical reasons why employees in public sys-
tems (teachers, correctional officials, etc.) are 
discouraged from befriending youth—these 
factors have all converged to make declining 
adult presence in youthful lives a major social 
transformation. Mentoring at best only dents 
this transformation, but it is hard to see that as 
an argument against it.
In short, the above three reasons present a 
powerful rationale for applauding the appear-
ance of mentoring, if not breathing a healthy 
sigh of relief that something has taken root 
that actually helps young people and that has 
broad support across the political spectrum.
Case closed? If only it were so simple. There are, 
in fact, several important critiques and some 
real resistance to mentoring as mainstream 
9social policy. On analysis, some seem weak—and 
some very thoughtful. Few are voiced publicly 
or loudly because mentoring is popular and 
successful and has the three strong rationales 
outlined above. I have presented the concerns 
below and tried to assess their substantive and 
political importance.
The Zero-Sum Game
Many involved in social policy see it as a sec-
tor with no significant prospects for expan-
sion: If one aspect of policy gets bigger, 
another will get smaller. Those who grew up 
in the 1960s and 1970s may have believed 
that such expansion was inevitable or have 
seen its achievement as simply a function of 
politics, but in retrospect, those views seem 
optimistic and naive.
For the past 25 years, America’s basically 
centrist values vis-à-vis the role of the public 
sector on social welfare issues have asserted 
themselves. The profusion of legislation in the 
1960s and early 1970s to address social issues 
now seems less an inevitable social trend than 
an artifact of an unusual set of historical cir-
cumstances, shaped primarily by America’s 
success in World War II and the climax of the 
civil rights movement.
This reassertion of dominant values was 
most vividly apparent in the 1990s, when a 
Democratic president in a booming economy 
with a massive federal budget surplus could 
not move forward major “progressive” social 
legislation, nor did he really make much 
effort to do so. To say that the Republican-
controlled House and Senate blocked such 
movement is only to say that the American 
political system on balance did not support 
such movement—much as it also did not 
support any major “regressive” movement 
on social policy, as the brief flash of Newt 
Gingrich and the Contract with America 
movement showed.
The political system instead reflected well 
the preference of the culture for a centrist, 
practical conservatism on social issues. The 
Democratic Party itself reflected that cen-
trism; its leadership was proud to “change 
welfare as we know it” (read: remove entitle-
ments and their incentives for dependency) 
and be the ones to proclaim the end of the 
era of Big Government.
Does this mean the end of public social 
policy? Hardly. Centrism does not imply total 
destruction of or lack of opportunity in social 
policy; it does imply caution and limits rather 
than unbridled enthusiasm.
The most powerful and durable manifestation 
of centrism is the outcomes movement, which 
in the 1990s spread like wildfire throughout the 
social policy world, in both the public and phil-
anthropic sectors. Put most simply, that move-
ment said: Don’t just tug at my heartstrings; 
prove that your social policy accomplishes some-
thing. The fact that this proof has not come 
easily has played a strong role in the growing 
suspicion that maybe many social problems are 
simply not “solvable” by social policy.
That suspicion and the evidence that backs it 
have a political consequence: They generate 
declining interest in the body politic generally 
in continuing to try to create social policy that 
will solve those problems and generate fuel for 
those who never wanted to try in the first place.
Passion of a few for not trying at all, and less 
interest from many in the prospects of trying, 
add up to an emerging political decision that 
moves social policy another notch down on 
the priority list of uses for public policy and 
taxpayer money. And given that only a small 
minority of Americans ever had the desire for 
America to become like a Northern European 
social welfare state, the politics of social policy 
for young people begins to look more like 
a series of occasional arguments than a sus-
tained and serious effort.
In this view of the current state of American 
politics, the success of mentoring becomes less 
a building block—hey, things do work; have 
hope, voters, we should keep at these issues!—
than a growing piece of a diminishing pie. For 
many voters, discovering that mentoring works 
is a satisfying end to this somewhat depressing 
process of finding solutions to tough human 
and social problems.
Furthermore, mentoring’s success may hasten 
the pie’s shrinkage. For mentoring is something 
volunteers do, and what they do is very limited: 
They develop a relationship. If that’s all it takes, 
some social conservatives would (and do) say, 
what is all this talk about social change and 
comprehensive services? What does the public 
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sector need to do except provide a little cash for 
expansion of mentoring? The major work and 
the major money are all private.
These conclusions play very well to the inter-
ests and beliefs of a small but very vocal and 
politically powerful group of American leaders 
and institutions; they also are very seductive to 
a larger group of Americans who would like  
to believe these kids can be helped, and if it can 
be done simply, privately and without much bur-
den on taxpayers’ wallets, all the better.
Is the “zero-sum/declining sum” critique of 
mentoring accurate? More accurate than the 
“building optimism for social policy through 
success” argument? I think that both these 
positions are accurate, in the sense that both 
are in play. We are currently in some version 
of a zero-sum game, with mentoring absorbing 
a larger share of the resources. But we do need 
to have success as well, not just moral claims, to 
increase interest and the size of the pie.
How this all resolves itself—which analysis turns 
out right—is less a matter of cultural values 
or historical trend and more a matter of who 
uses mentoring the most effectively as an advocacy 
tool. Centrism, even a conservative centrism, 
does not inherently deny growth or possibil-
ity for new initiatives in social policy: It simply 
makes them hard to get. The pie can grow—if 
a convincing case can be made not only that it 
should, but that it will produce outcomes.
One thing seems likely: To deny or undercut 
mentoring’s importance is not a sound strat-
egy for the future of public social policy for 
youth. Mentoring simply has too much going 
for it: It is a social initiative with broad appeal 
that gives hope that adolescence is not too 
late to intervene. Mentoring needs to be built 
on—used as a foundation stone—to advocate 
successfully for other social initiatives.
Mentoring’s greatest usefulness, far beyond 
its value as a program, is its affirmation of the 
value and role of nonfamily adults in chil-
dren’s lives and in their healthy development. 
Focusing on mentoring only as a program can 
easily play into the zero/declining-sum game 
because mentoring’s advocates, in their zeal 
to expand, will undercut the importance of 
other initiatives—that’s what competition is 
all about. Seeing mentoring too broadly—as 
affirming the role of adults—only plunks  
mentoring into the thicket of family policy 
issues (e.g., shouldn’t we promote more fam-
ily in kids’ lives, rather than mentors?). That 
can go many ways.
No, mentoring is a practical response to the 
immobilizing “Does it take a village or just 
parents to raise a child?” debate. The answer 
is, as usual, in between: It takes parents and 
some caring strangers. Mentors are strang-
ers, at least at first; so are coaches, teachers, 
police, juvenile detention staff and so on. 
Mentoring programs formalize and demystify 
what the “village” means. But it’s just one way. 
Kids need more support—in today’s world, as 
much as they can get. Mentoring is the headline 
on what needs to be done in every institution 
that deals with young people. Practice will 
vary, because roles vary, but youth need more 
nonfamily adults making intentionally positive 
contributions to their sense of importance, 
usefulness and integrity. Strangers have a lot 
to do with both success and character.
The Limits on Scale
Though mentoring seems straightforward—a 
caring relationship—that simplicity is decep-
tive, and that deceptiveness has profound 
consequences for the number of volunteers 
mentoring can expect. For one, not all adults 
are adept at developing relationships with a 
young stranger (even in BBBSA, with its care-
ful selection and training, about one in four 
just don’t do that good a job; see Tierney et al. 
1995). Second, only a modest percentage of 
adults want to serve as mentors (Scales 2003).
Getting volunteers always has been a challenge 
for mentoring agencies. When P/PV did its 
study in the early 1990s, most sites in the study 
had long waiting lists, and it was not unusual 
for a youth to wait 18 months to get a mentor.
But the more serious limit on the number of 
volunteers available is neither competence 
nor desire, but what mentoring asks of its 
volunteers. This is no monthly visit to the play-
ground or weekend help rebuilding the barn. 
It’s once a week, several hours a week, for 52 
weeks—that’s what the research to date tells 
us it takes to get results (Grossman, Rhodes 
2002; Tierney et al. 1995). A little multipli-
cation delivers the sobering message that a 
mentor commits to more than 100 hours a 
year—that’s almost three standard workweeks!
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How many adults, even the most competent 
and caring, will volunteer to do that? Of 
course, better effort on the part of mentoring 
agencies will unearth more volunteers—but 
most new volunteers replace retiring ones. It 
is difficult to substantially increase the num-
ber of volunteers willing to put in the time 
mentioned above (see Stukas and Tanti, in 
DuBois, Karcher 2005).
So unlike most social policies, “going to 
scale” is not primarily a function of financial 
resources. Beyond a certain point, you simply 
can’t “buy” volunteers.
When you hear that Americans are the hardest- 
working people on the planet—averaging, 
for example, nine weeks a year more work than 
the Germans—you can imagine why adding 
three weeks of mentoring would be a chal-
lenge. An AOL Time Warner poll conducted 
in 2002 found, however, that of those adults 
who do not currently volunteer as mentors, 42 
percent (or 54 million) would seriously con-
sider mentoring if they had a variety of sup-
ports (AOL Time Warner Foundation 2002). 
These include a choice of mentoring options 
tailored to schedule and interests, access to 
expert help, orientation and training before 
mentoring, release time and encouragement 
from their employer and flexibility in where 
the mentoring takes place.
Mentoring organizations have been respon-
sive to the challenges and the opportunities. 
Some BBBSA localities—Boston is a notable 
example—have brought in business consul-
tants, streamlined their process and sunk 
more resources into recruitment in order to 
find out what the natural limits on scale are. 
Smart effort will move that limit well beyond 
the current number. Some corporations and 
mentoring providers, Goldman Sachs and LA 
Team Mentoring, for instance, have incor-
porated more flexible, volunteer-friendly 
approaches such as bringing young people 
to the workplace for mentoring sessions and 
teaming up two or more adults to mentor 
one or more children.
Advocates estimate that about 15 million 
youth need mentors (MENTOR/National 
Mentoring Partnership). It seems a safe bet 
that the natural limit on volunteers willing to 
serve as mentors in formal programs such as 
BBBSA is substantially short of that.
That mentoring can never address the full 
scope of need is not a criticism but simply a 
fact; it is a natural limitation of any social ini-
tiative based on volunteering. The importance 
of this concept lies not in that it invalidates 
mentoring or that it should reduce efforts and 
resources to take mentoring to its fullest scale, 
whatever that is, because social initiatives with 
evidence of effectiveness are not legion. The 
importance of this idea is that it should be 
realized and stated for the fact that it is.
The tendency to embrace simple solutions 
and to become exhausted by tough social 
problems are ordinary human traits, which 
if allowed to flourish become serious social 
and moral failings of the larger society. 
Mentoring’s advocates have the tough respon-
sibility of not overselling their product; it is a 
discipline achieved only by remaining aware 
of and stating that volunteer mentoring is an 
important but limited programmatic solution. 
If mentoring’s critics will not encourage it 
reaching its maximum scale—and mentoring’s 
advocates will not acknowledge that the maxi-
mum will still fall way short of need—they 
both may contribute to the “diminishing sum” 
process noted earlier.
Quality Control
The most confounding factor regarding track-
ing and assessing the scale issue over the 
coming years is knowing what we mean by 
mentoring and what we expect of it—that is, 
the issue of quality control. A significant part 
of mentoring’s appeal as a public policy initia-
tive worthy of taxpayer support is the belief 
generated by the 1995 impact study that men-
toring produces changes in youth behavior 
related to drug use, violence and school per-
formance. Our current state of knowledge says 
it takes the volunteer time and effort noted 
above to achieve these results.
But the current strategy emphasized by 
BBBSA and many of its local affiliates is to 
recruit volunteers to mentor children at their 
schools, usually over lunch, for one to one 
and a half hours per week. This does make 
recruitment easier and accounts for a sub-
stantial share of the growth of BBBSA during 
the past five years. It also raises the question 
of whether such modifications to mentoring’s 
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basic and proven model will produce the same 
impressive results. If they don’t, does mentor-
ing still make sense as a public policy initiative?
P/PV recently completed an impact study of 
BBBS school-based mentoring. The study 
confirmed that school-based programs are 
able to attract mentors who would be unlikely 
to volunteer in traditional community-based 
programs. And researchers found that school-
based mentoring does produce important 
outcomes, including improved performance 
in science and oral and verbal language, 
fewer serious school infractions, fewer unex-
cused absences, and improved confidence in 
their academic abilities. Unfortunately, these 
benefits dissipated in the second year of the 
study. Researchers identified several ways that 
programs should be strengthened if school-
based mentoring is to reach its potential, and 
BBBSA is now working to implement these 
recommendations.
And what about the issue of quality control in 
non-BBBSA programs, which account, by the 
best estimate, for the majority of all current 
mentors? The quality control problem is not 
peculiar to mentoring; it is the bête noire of 
all social initiatives that achieve popularity and 
scale. Our decentralized political system and 
romance with “local uniqueness” make it very 
difficult to replicate initial impact. Head Start 
is a relevant example, because it too had early 
evidence of impact and achieved rapid popu-
larity and growth; its growth has been plagued 
by a lack of rigor and quality control.
Should the quality control issue—both its 
generic nature and mentoring’s early swerve 
from the “proven model”—be enough to 
dampen enthusiasm for mentoring as a social 
policy fixture with a steady tap into the tax-
payers’ pockets?
The answer is a clear “no.” Quality control of 
large-scale social policy initiatives is, as noted 
above, largely an artifact of our political sys-
tem and culture, often exacerbated by the 
inadequate capacity of public bureaucracies 
to train, monitor and control. Mentoring is a 
rare social policy initiative in that it comes to 
the taxpayer with a private, nationwide orga-
nization, BBBSA, already in place. A second, 
more recent private organization, MENTOR/
National Mentoring Partnership, not only advo-
cates mentoring but actively promotes quality 
standards. Thus, the capacity and potential 
for quality control and transparency of action 
are at a higher level from the outset than the 
vast majority of social policy initiatives. In fact, 
each of the 3,700 programs in MENTOR’s vol-
unteer referral system agrees to adhere to the 
Elements of Effective Practice (MENTOR/National 
Mentoring Partnership 2003) and can get help 
doing so from the network of State Mentoring 
Partnerships (MENTOR/National Mentoring 
Partnership 2004).
Though BBBSA is not and will never be the 
only organization doing mentoring, its “mar-
ket share” is substantial (if you’re from the 
for-profit world, it’s awesome). MENTOR/
National Mentoring Partnership’s influence 
is extensive with other mentoring initiatives. 
Thus, the potential for widespread high-quality 
programming is great.
The Mentees
Perhaps the most challenging critique of men-
toring as a programmatic intervention is that 
its mentees are not the youth who are likely 
to be the biggest problems to themselves, 
their families, their friends, their communities 
and society at large. Analyzing this critique 
demands care, for it is not true that mentoring 
as commonly practiced purposefully enrolls 
youth who don’t need much help. In fact, 
mentoring’s traditional practice of enrolling 
youth whose single parent or guardian says 
they need a mentor (or in school-based men-
toring, enrolling youth whose teachers say 
they could benefit from a mentor) get about 
as intimate a judgment of need as you could 
ask for—certainly more likely to be accurate 
than eligibility based on race or income, pro-
fessional interviews or Rorschach tests.
No, mentoring’s limit on the youth is not that 
the youth it usually gets can’t benefit from 
mentoring; it’s that the youth it usually doesn’t 
get have the bigger problems. Mentoring’s 
strengths, based on experience and data, are 
generally in the 8- through 13-year age range 
and concentrated in 9- to 11-year-olds. They are 
youth with responsible parents or teachers who 
want to connect them with mentors.
Youth who are older; who don’t have a parent 
caring, knowledgeable, or insightful enough, 
or a teacher who finds them sympathetic; who 
are on the streets or in homeless shelters; who 
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are in foster care or a juvenile institution—
these youth do not often get volunteer men-
tors in the course of ordinary mentoring 
programs. Yet their “at riskness” is clearly mag-
nitudes higher than the 10-year-olds who now 
make up the majority of mentees.
At first blush, it seems unlikely that these 
higher-risk youth will get mentors: How many 
adult volunteers will take on such a challenge? 
In fact, the emerging evidence is mixed. 
Rigorous attempts to resolve this ambiguity 
represent one of mentoring’s most promising 
opportunities, for the more likely its mentees 
are, without mentors, to become problems, 
the more valuable its services are; the more 
important (and justifiable) it becomes as pub-
lic social policy; and the less important it is to 
have huge numbers of volunteers. The better 
you can target, the smaller the numbers get.
P/PV’s multisite, high-risk older-youth 
demonstration (The National Faith-Based 
Initiative—or NFBI), which focused in part 
on securing mentors for older youth who had 
already had brushes with the criminal justice 
system, had very modest success in securing 
volunteer mentors. Given a choice about how 
to use their time and good intentions, few 
volunteers chose to work with older youth 
(Bauldry, Hartmann 2004).
More recently, P/PV’s Ready4Work/Juvenile 
Ready4Work initiative showed slightly more 
encouraging results. Programs in this 17-site 
prisoner reentry demonstration were able to 
recruit large numbers of mentors for a very 
challenging group of mentees—young men 
and women (ages 14 through 34) returning 
from incarceration and juvenile detention.
The WAY program of Children’s Village, a 
residential treatment facility for very trou-
bled foster care youth, has been successful in 
getting volunteer mentors for these youth as 
they are leaving foster care. Careful analysis 
of projects such as these may tell us whether 
strategy, effort, personnel or happenstance 
made the difference in recruiting mentors 
for high-risk populations—and whether suc-
cess appears replicable.
For younger youth without the support of a 
referring parent, the record is also mixed. 
The Amachi initiative, which provides men-
tors for youth with parents in prison, has been 
remarkably successful in getting volunteer 
mentors by targeting faith organizations and 
congregations (Jucovy 2003). In Philadelphia, 
Amachi’s demonstration city, more than 500 
volunteers came forward in the first year. That 
is clearly a success by the standard of tradi-
tional mentoring, though it also reflects the 
conclusion of the earlier discussion: It is far 
short of the number of youth with an incar-
cerated parent, which in Philadelphia alone is 
more than 25,000.
But Amachi’s success, however modest, indi-
cates the appeal to policymakers of focusing 
mentoring on a group of youth with significant 
prospects of troubled lives: President Bush 
announced it in his 2003 State of the Union 
as a major policy initiative, and there are cur-
rently more than 270 mentoring children of 
prisoners programs, including Amachi pro-
grams, around the country.
On the other hand, an initiative begun in 
the early 1990s in Portland, Oregon, called 
Friends of the Children (FoCh), which targets 
first-graders who are already exhibiting trou-
bling behaviors in the classroom and whose 
families range from unsupportive to dysfunc-
tional, tried but finally gave up on providing 
mentors through volunteers and instead hires 
and pays its Friends. Some of the difficulty in 
recruitment may have been FoCh’s blunt mes-
sage: These kids need help and support, lots 
of it, and they’re going to need it for a long 
time. No seduction here.
But the decision that volunteers were insuf-
ficient was not made without trying, and it cer-
tainly was not tinged by ideology: The program’s 
founder is not biased toward professional social 
services, nor does he hope for a social welfare 
state. Given that in its initial years, he paid for 
the program out of his own pocket, he had 
many reasons to prefer volunteers.
FoCh appears to target a higher-risk group 
than Amachi and proposes a more demanding 
program; it is no surprise that volunteers were 
judged insufficient. But Amachi youth are not 
all cherubs, and certainly their “situation” is 
bound to chill some volunteers. Amachi, by 
recruiting largely through churches, is betting 
both that faith volunteers will take on tougher 
kids and, equally important, that their congre-
gations will support the individual volunteers 
and supplement what they do, thus emulating 
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a family setting in density and duration (see 
Maton, Sto. Domingo and King, in DuBois, 
Karcher 2005). Again, it will be critical to look 
more closely at the issues posed by the very 
different approaches of Amachi and FoCh 
and see whether volunteering is indeed a via-
ble strategy for addressing older and higher-
risk youth groups.
In short, innovative approaches to targeting 
and recruitment may both increase mentor-
ing’s value to social policy and take some pres-
sure off the numbers of mentors required to 
ensure that youth at serious risk of a life of 
problems are served. Or they may not; we just 
don’t know yet.
These issues are mentoring’s “frontier.”
Insufficient Content
Another substantive critique is simply that men-
toring is not enough. In this view, mentoring’s 
results are not likely to hold up as a youth ages; 
it won’t be transformational, because an at-risk 
youth needs more, at more times of his or her 
life, than a mentor provides.
Like the previous critiques, this one does 
not lend itself to a clean answer. On the one 
hand, mentoring does not provide all or even 
most things that every youth needs. But then, 
no social intervention does or ever will. Nor 
do most families. Nor, I think, is this sort of 
perfection worth pursuing—it only diverts us 
from what is possible.
Mentoring doesn’t provide enough to ensure 
even a fair chance that each youth’s assets and 
talents are built on. Only a lucky minority in 
life get that, and we have yet to figure out how 
to duplicate it through social policy with con-
sistency, at any scale. But this is worth striving 
for. And no doubt, some form of mentoring 
will be a part of it.
The question for social intervention policy 
is: Does mentoring provide enough input to 
help avoid some problems, achieve some suc-
cesses and leave some personal attributes that 
together provide a stronger foundation for the 
challenges and decisions that these youth will 
likely face? Only evaluations will answer that 
series of questions definitively; the findings to 
date are promising. But it is on this issue that 
I think mentoring’s critics undervalue it. For 
many youth who are already behind in life, 
with only modest support and few prospects, 
neither services and opportunities (the liberal 
approach) nor punishment and/or appeals 
to determination and resolve (the conserva-
tive approach) touch the chords that make 
humans keep moving forward when they are 
in difficult circumstances and have little to fall 
back on. Both the standard conservative and 
standard liberal approaches assume enough 
emotional connectedness in reserve to coun-
ter those inevitable moments when services 
aren’t sufficient, opportunities aren’t what 
they seemed, determination just falters or 
punishment doesn’t deter. What young people 
need at moments like that is something much 
more personal: faith; or another person we 
don’t want to let down, who has confidence in 
us; or best of all, both.
The need for these “other factors” is especially 
acute for many disadvantaged youth. For 
though we all love to tell youth that “you can 
be anything you want”—and love to celebrate 
those exceptional individuals who have done 
just that—in fact, most youth, like most of us, 
don’t believe it. Most youth with a strike or 
two against them especially don’t believe it. 
They know that whatever they get out of life 
will be a struggle and will most likely have lim-
its. When that is your view on life, and when 
it is rooted in experience, disappointment 
and setbacks are wearying, not inspirational 
pebbles on some inevitable path to the top. 
Willpower alone wavers; plans seem futile; ser-
vices seem abstract.
The desire to pick yourself up and go on 
demands a deeper touch. A nonfamily friend 
who cares may do the trick. The very lack 
of family ties is what makes this possible for 
some youth; the caring and confidence are 
more trustworthy, unaffected by history (see 
Rhodes, in DuBois, Karcher 2005).
Thus, mentoring often may not be enough to 
achieve certain goals; it also often may be the 
indispensable element to ensure that the bot-
tom doesn’t fall out for youth attempting to 
achieve those goals, to ensure that hope and 
effort are maintained. Maintenance of hope and 
effort through difficult times do build character, 
confidence and resilience. That is the stuff that 
makes, step-by-step, for transformation.
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Change, Not Charity
This critique harks back to the earlier discus-
sion of “zero/declining sum,” with a slight 
twist: that at its core, mentoring is a charitable 
act, a kindness to a stranger, improvement in 
the life of people one at a time—whereas what 
we need is social change, where change comes 
to larger groups of individuals all at once and, 
at the same time, positions future generations 
better. Mentoring as social policy, under this 
critique, is diversionary at best, reactionary 
at worst. Even if it is effective and does build 
confidence in social policy, it remains diver-
sionary and/or reactionary because it builds 
confidence in the capacity of individuals to 
help individuals and thus blunts the funda-
mental need for broader social change.
It is hard to see how any responsible citizen 
could be against a social change that would 
suddenly improve the lives of large numbers 
of youth. Thus, I pay careful attention to this 
critique.
But the strength of this critique seems pri-
marily at the ideological and rhetorical level. 
Unless we can set forth what social change 
we’re talking about in concrete terms and 
make the case equally concrete as to how 
mentoring gets in the way, it’s difficult to see 
why we shouldn’t help individuals when we 
know how to do it, and when it’s politically 
feasible to do so. Putting aside individuals 
for the sake of highly conceptual ideas of a 
greater good has been a common practice 
throughout human history in every corner 
of the globe; it’s hard to find good examples 
where the promise has been delivered and 
easy to find examples where it has not. But 
we should always be open to broader changes 
with widespread benefits, so long as they 
can be concretely articulated and examples 
brought forth.
The notion of helping individuals is too easily 
maligned by rhetoric. That such help, even out 
of charity, has become regressive to many in 
the social policy world seems more the product 
of frustration than of clear-minded strategy.
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Future Directions
Reviewing the pros and cons of the above 
issues leads me to conclude that on balance, 
the advance of mentoring into the realm of 
public policy and public funding has been a 
very positive phenomenon, substantively and 
strategically. It has injected the importance of 
adult–youth relationships, and in particular 
nonfamily relationships, into almost every 
major policy initiative that deals with youth—
an important counter to the highly techno-
cratic and/or highly political approaches that 
have dominated so many policy initiatives and 
that miss the simply human factor at the core 
of most individual improvement.
Mentoring is also something about which 
there is broad agreement that it works. 
Though I don’t dismiss lightly the “zero/
declining sum” and “change not charity” cri-
tiques, I think that both underestimate the 
widespread sense that little or nothing works 
and the role this attitude has played in getting 
social policy to the low esteem in which it’s 
held today. I think both also underestimate 
the durability of the outcomes movement; it is 
too consistent with a centrist-practical political 
culture to be dislodged for long by the fervor 
of big ideas, whether from the left or right. 
We should use its traction, not resist it.
However, despite all its benefits, I am not con-
vinced that mentoring as a program initiative 
should have its own policy domain or its own 
major legislation. It is better for the long-term 
effectiveness of social policy if mentoring and 
its broader idea of the critical importance 
of nonfamily relationships are as policy (a) 
injected in appropriate forms into the various 
existing legislation and policy domains relat-
ing to youth and (b) highlighted or tested as 
special initiatives to demonstrate new uses or 
emphases for mentoring, be they targeting chil-
dren of prisoners or homeless families, assisting 
the transition from foster care, guiding the 
transition into work and careers, reducing the 
extreme isolation of juvenile facilities or work-
ing with very young children who are exhibit-
ing poor behaviors in the classroom. It is with 
these highest-risk youth that the human factor 
exemplified by mentoring is most missing and 
needed, and it is with those youth and the insti-
tutions with whom they interact that its lessons 
most need to be injected and integrated. The 
2003 report from the White House Task Force 
for Disadvantaged Youth underscored this view.
Efforts to aggregate mentoring into, say, a 
“Million Mentors” piece of legislation, as some 
have suggested, would in my judgment shift 
the balance among the pros and cons laid out 
above under the various critiques away from 
mentoring’s strengths:
•	 It	would	make	quality	control	more	diffi-
cult in the rush for numbers and funding.
•	 It	would	remove	incentives	to	target	under-
served, high-risk youth, again, to get num-
bers and money.
•	 It	would	play	to	the	sense	that	“we’ve	found	
the answer,” which is just too convenient 
and easy to do in a political world so fix-
ated on sound bites and media strategy.
•	 It	would	narrow	mentoring’s	importance	to	
that of a program, when its ultimate impor-
tance lies more in the imaginative and flex-
ible use of its lessons in all institutions that 
deal with youth.
In sum, mentoring’s emergence over the last 
decade from the world of private philanthropy 
into that of public policy and funding has 
been important and beneficial. But the usual 
next step—consolidating its various gains into 
major social policy legislation—is not, in my 
judgment, the best next step. Infiltration, not 
consolidation, is where mentoring’s greatest 
usefulness lies in the years ahead.
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